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World leaders, primarily through the United Nations, have been
almost unanimous in their wholesale condemnation of the ubiquitous,
arbitrary violation of basic human rights by sovereign states, but very
little has been done in practice to end abuses of this nature.
On the international scene, the individual's fundamental rights and
freedom are now widely acknowledged, especially after the external
effects of Hitler's tyranny clearly demonstrated that, humanitarian considerations apart, it is generally in the interest of world peace that states
not have unfettered freedom to deny their citizens the basic human
rights. Hence, when the United Nations came into existence after the
Second World War, one of its main concerns or objectives was "to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of
"'
nations large and small ....
To further the equality of all member nations, large and small, as
well as their security against external attack, the U. N. Charter went on
to provide as follows: "The Organization is based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of all its members." 2 "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." 3 There is an obvious dilemma here.
If a state deprives its citizens of their fundamental human rights,
what can the United Nations do? According to the positivist doctrine,
only states are subjects of international law. Consequently, the individual is accorded no claimable rights under the positivist view.
The basis for this position, as explained by Oppenheim (and thus
far acknowledged by the International Court) is that "[s] ince the Law
of Nations is based on the common consent of individual States, and
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not of individual human beings, States solely and exclusively are the
subjects of International Law." '
But Grotius would not concur in this conclusion. In his view a
state could, on the grounds of humanitarian consideration, intervene in
the affairs of another state to protect its inhabitants' human rights:
Though it is a rule established by the laws of nature and
social order, and a rule confirmed by all the records of history,
that every sovereign is supreme judge in his own kingdom
and over his own subjects, in whose disputes no foreign power
can justly interfere. Yet where a Busiris, a Phalaris or a
Thracian Diomede provoke their people to despair and resistance by unheard of cruelties, having themselves abandoned
all the laws of nature, they lose the rights of independent
sovereigns, and can no longer claim the privilege of the law
of nations. Thus Constantine took up arms against Maxentius
and Licinius, and other Roman emperors either took, or
threatened to take them against the Persians, if they did not
desist from persecuting the Christians.
Admitting that it would be fraught with the greatest
dangers if subjects were allowed to redress grievances by
force of arms, it does not necessarily follow that other powers
are prohibited from giving them assistance when labouring
under grievous oppressions.r
Vattel, another eminent international jurist, vehemently disagrees
with Grotius:
No foreign state may inquire into the manner in which a
sovereign rules, nor set itself up as a judge of his conduct,
nor force him to make any change in his administration. If
he burdens his subjects with taxes or treats them with severity
it is for the Nation to take action; no foreign State is called
on to amend his conduct and to force him to follow a wiser
and juster course.'
From the foregoing it is clear that under existing institutions
fundamental human rights can exist only in a utopian world of rhetoric
and semantics. In his home country the individual is often at the mercy
of an omnipotent government. On the international level he remains
unrecognized as the subject of legally enforceable rights. Where then
can he turn?
41 L. OPPENHEI,
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 13 (1905).
But see H. KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 233-34 (A. Wedberg transl. 1945).
5H. GRoTIus, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE bk. II, ch. XXV, § 8 (A.

Campbell transl. 1901).
6 E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW

bk. II, §55 (C. Fenwick trans]. 1916).
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In the interest of such "helpless" individuals Luis Kutner has
made an eloquent plea for the establishment of a world court of habeas
corpus, to guard against arbitrary and capricious governmental action.
In The Human Right to IndividualFreedom--A Symposium on World

Habeas Corpus, Kutner has compiled a collection of essays contributed
by an eminent group of jurists from every part of the world. Roscoe
Pound, Quincy Wright, William 0. Douglas, Dr. Udo Udoma, and
Prince Sihanouk are among those who, in this collection, have expressed their views on the fundamental rights of man. Although some
of the essays are reprints of earlier articles, most are newly conceived.
The writ of habeas corpus has proven to be the most effective
means of protecting the citizen against arbitrary arrest and illegal
detention. In Nigeria, for example, the Republican Constitution of
1963, the Habeas Corpus Law of Western Nigeria and the MidWestern State, and the Habeas Corpus Acts of 1679 and 1816, as well
as the English common law, provide the machinery for release via
habeas corpus. The Nigerian procedures protect the individual entitled
to bail, and the right of those detained to a speedy trial.
But against the omnipotent and oppressive state, manned by "tin
gods," the writ in practice becomes almost powerless-and this can be
not only demoralizing, but spiritually enslaving as well. Dr. Udo
Udoma has expressed the problem well:
The thought that a citizen or national can be detained without
charge or trial must of necessity affect the morale of the local
population. Courage and boldness among the population
become rare commodities. Detentions of this kind destroy
individual originality and engender the belief among the
people that any criticism of the activities of state officials is a
crime, even though proper criticism ought to be accepted as a
sine qua non for the proper functioning of a democracy. Fear
and a feeling of insecurity are generated; and individual freedom, the very foundation of a democratic society based on the
rule of law, which should germinate and flourish in every
society, is thwarted and destroyed. Man thus becomes a mere
cog in the wheel of the state so that to all intents and purposes
he is given the impression that he was created for the state
instead of the state for him.
In such circumstances, if the free world is to have a
meaningful survival, it becomes the duty of all men of good
will throughout the world-the idealist, the humanist, the
Christian, and the true and sincere democrat, of whom there
are many, who believe in a free society and a world in which
the rule of law must reign supreme-to unite together to find
a way of releasing mankind from this new chain of bondage
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and oppression and thereby bring an end to the prevalent
venomous practice of arbitrary arrest and detention.7
The genesis of such an international effort may well occur in the
concept of a world court of habeas corpus. Indeed, a treaty statute
establishing such a court, first proposed before the American Bar
Association in 1959, has undergone several revisions since that time.
This is certainly a most laudable proposition, but if the experience
of the International Court of Justice in the Hague is at all indicative,
it would appear that the proposed habeas corpus court would accomplish little that is constructive. The solution may lie, however, in the
approach which Leonard Suttin, Chairman of the U. S. Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission, has proposed:
Surely regional international courts of world habeas corpus
are within reach and once created and obeyed, will permit
those who in good faith adhere to the precepts of the U.N.
Charter to see to it that at least in their countries there is
protection against arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention.
Hopefully then, this safeguard can gradually but surely be
extended to all men everywhere.'
Peace in the last analysis, as the late President John Kennedy
often said, is basically a matter of human rights. It is therefore painfully obvious that if we are to have lasting peace, we must use every
effective weapon to strike at those who abuse human rights-and who
thereby divide man from man, and nation from nation. 9
7Udoma,

INDV ,UAL

Some Thoughts on World Habeas Corpus, in THE HUMAN

RIGHT TO
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8 Sutton, Habeas Corpits-Its Past, Present, and Possible Worldwide Future, in

THE HumAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEIom 180 (L. Kutner ed. 1970).
9
See Pound, Introduction to THE HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVMuAL FREEDOm at 15
(L. Kutner ed. 1970).
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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD.
By MAURO CAPPELLETTI. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Inc., 1970. Pp. x, 116. $8.50.
Adolf Homburger 1
Professor Mauro Cappelletti, Europe's leading authority in the
field of comparative civil procedure,' tells us that his book is "primarily
meant for students." 2 He overestimates American familiarity with
constitutional processes in other parts of the world. Few Americans,
whether students, teachers, or practitioners, know how the civilians
allocate functions between the judicial and political branches of government in a clash between constitutional imperatives and law of a lower
order. Perhaps American unfamiliarity with civilian institutions may
be explained on the grounds that judicial review of legislation in civil
law countries is of recent origin, going back to the periods following the
First and particularly the Second World Wars,3 and that the American
literature on the subject is meager. Professor Cappelletti's book fills
the need for more information with a thoughtful, tightly written and
easily readable study that places the systems of the Western World in
comparative perspective and describes and evaluates their leading characteristics. In a very real sense, the book complements and fulfills the
mission of the valuable collection of monographs on contemporary
constitutional review, published by the Max-Planck-Institute in 1962.4
Although the author aims at basics rather than technical details, the
rendering of the subject is never superficial. The text is documented
by a wealth of information assembled in footnotes that contain a great
deal more than reference materials. At times the reader regrets that
the author relegated provocative thoughts and creative comments to
footnote status.
In presenting the materials, the author adopts the method of the
modern comparative school that "seeks to combine the virtues of both
natural law and positivism by adopting the realistic methods of positivism in the search for common elements in legal institutions of various
T Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. D.U.J. 1929,
University of Vienna; LL.B. 1941, University of Buffalo. Member, New York Bar.
I The author is Professor of Law at Stanford University and the University of
Florence and Director of the Institute of Comparative Law at the University of
Florence. Among his numerous publications, the best known in the United States
include THE ITALIAT LEGAL SYSTEM (1967) (with J. H. Merryman and J.M. Perillo)
and CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY (1965) (with J. M. Perillo).
2 M. CAPPELLXTTI, JUDICIAL REvwIw IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD vii n.1 (1971).
3 E.g., Austria 1920-1929, Spain 1931, Italy 1948, Germany 1949, Cyprus 1960,
Turkey 1961, Yugoslavia 1963. See M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 2, at 46-51.
4 MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FOR AuSIANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT, VERFASSUNGSGERICHSBARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART (1962).
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nations and the common values expressed in them." ' Since protection
of individual rights guaranteed by the constitutions of the modern world
depends on the availability of effective remedies, the relevance of the
author's search for "the common core" of constitutional control devices
will not be lost on the reader. A careful study of the book will reward
him not only with a deeper understanding of our domestic institutions,
but also with the comforting thought that our system today still shows
remarkable strength and inspires imitation by other systems. On the
other hand, experience with the American system abroad exemplifies
the difficulties of transplanting legal institutions into foreign soil that
is not properly prepared for them.
The first half of the book, comprising a preface and chapters I
and II,contains mainly introductory and historical materials. The
book opens by contrasting two fundamentally different methods of
control of constitutionality: political and judicial.' The former is
usually preventive, forestalling unconstitutional exercise of legislative
power, while the latter is remedial, correcting legislative transgressions. 7
The Italian system serves as the author's example of a country with
dual controls, judicial and political, the latter exercised through the
President of the Republic.' France and the Soviet Union are examples
of countries that reject judicial control altogether, relying exclusively
on political control devices, albeit, as the author points out, for entirely
different historical and ideological reasons. Rejection of judicial control in Soviet Russia reflects its conception of unitary state power and
its opposition to the "bourgeois doctrine" of separation of powers.9
Resistance to judicial control in France, on the other hand, is traceable
to that country's bad experience with the judiciary in pre-revolutionary
days and the glorification of the doctrine of separation of powers in
pure form.' 0
Professor Cappelletti sees possibilities for evolution in the direction of judicial control, at least in countries such as France where rejection of judicial review reflects the purists' notions of separation of
powers." The author's hypothesis is supported by the history of the
French "Cour de Cassation" which started out as an organ of legislative power and eventually became an organ of nonconstitutional judicial
review. 12 Perhaps more significant, as noted by the author, is the trend
M. CAPpEmLTT,
o Id.1-24.
"id. 1-2.
8Id. 6.
5

9id. 7.

TlOd. 3.
11 Id. 12-16.
12d.

supra note 2, at bx (footnote omitted).
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of the French "Conseil D'Etat" to exercise a measure of control of

constitutionality in reviewing abuses through administrative acts. 13
The author concludes the first part of his study with a highly
In
interesting synopsis of historical antecedents of judicial review."
whirlwind fashion he takes us through the centuries from the days of
the Greco-Roman civilization, through the early Church, the medieval
scholastics, the French Parliaments, the English courts of equity, and
the period of enlightenment philosophers, to modern times. As do
some other scholars, Professor Cappelletti questions the thesis that
judicial review of legislation was a distinctive American contribution
to political theory, and suggests that the American version of constitutionalism was but "the logical result of centuries of European thought
15 More specifically, the notion of a
and colonial experiences .
supreme law came naturally to the Americans who lived under colonial
charters and were quick to substitute constitutions for the charters and
judicial review for review of colonial laws by the Privy Council.16
I attribute little significance to this historical explanation for the
purpose of determining the question to whom the world is indebted for
modern constitutionalism. Yet the ability to fashion ways and means
by which vague theories are translated into operational reality is an
American characteristic. Few discoveries, if any, are made in a
vacuum. The credit rightly belongs to him who draws the spark from
the charged atmosphere, even though he did not create the tension.
Professor Cappelletti agrees that prior to the formation of the American
system "nothing similar had been created in other countries" " and
that the "worldwide movement [toward rigid rather than flexible constitutions with supremacy over other laws] was effectively begun by
the American Constitution of 1789 and its courageous interpretation
by the Supreme Court." is
The second half of the book is devoted to a comparative analysis
of modern systems of judicial review in the Western World. The author
selects two prototypes for intensive discussion: the American Constitution of 1789, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, and its structural
opposite, the Austrian Constitution of 1920-1929, a brainchild of the
distinguished Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen. While attention is focused
primarily on these two archetypes, Professor Cappelletti also manages
to acquaint the reader with variations and modifications represented in
*."..

13 Id. 16-19. A brief interlude is devoted to a review of special remedies of judicial control of constitutionality that developed in entirely different cultures: the
Anglo-American writ of habeas corpus; the Mexican amparo contra leyes; and the
German Verfassungsbeschwerde. All were fashioned for the protection of important
individual rights. Such special devices demonstrate that a similar response may be
to similar needs wherever they arise. Id. 19-23.
expected
141 d.25-43.
15 Id.25.
16 Id. 36-41.
17Id. 25.
18Id. 27.
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the constitutions of many other countries. Thus we find West Germany,
Italy, Cyprus, Turkey, and Yugoslavia in the Austrian camp, and
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, and even
countries of the Eastern World, such as Japan and India, in the American camp. Mexico and Ireland, according to the author, fall neatly
within neither the American nor Austrian models, instead exhibiting
"mixed" or "intermediate" characteristics. 9 Subjects of comparison
are the organs, 20 process, 21 and effects 22 of judicial control.

Starting with a penetrating discussion of organs of control,
chapter III contrasts the American "decentralized" and the Austrian
"centralized" systems. Under the Austrian system, the judiciary of
the ordinary courts, both high and low, must obey and apply all statutory law whether or not it conforms to the commands of the Constitution. Control of constitutionality, considered a predominantly political
act, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a centralized judicial organ,
the Constitutional Court of the Republic. In contradistinction, under
Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation of the supremacy clause of the
American Constitution, the power to review constitutionality of legislation in the United States rests with all judicial organs, state or federal, from top to bottom.
The author's rationalization of Austria's centralized system is unassailable. 23 The civilians, for ideological and historical reasons, lean
toward a sharper doctrine of separation of powers than we do.
Secondly, if all civilian courts were free to resolve constitutional questions, the absence of any doctrine of stare decisis in civil law countries
would leave the judges of each court theoretically free to determine the
constitutionality of a law for himself. And finally, the European career
judges are not "suitable" for the quasi-political task of determining
constitutional issues.
Professor Cappelletti does not deal with the question whether the
judges of the centralized constitutional courts of the Austrian variety
are well equipped to handle controversial constitutional questions in a
non-conceptualistic and socially responsible manner. For example, are
"part-time judges" who exercise judicial functions on the Constitutional
Court as a "side-line" in addition to their chief occupation (as provided
by the Austrian Constitution 24) "suitable" arbiters of constitutionality?
Even though they may not be drawn from the political branches of
government,2 5 one wonders if they are likely to resist outside pressures
when called upon to render politically sensitive or unpopular decisions.
19 Id.

20
Id.
21

46 n.5.

45-68.
1d. 69-84.

22

1d. 85-96.
23Id. 53-66.
24 See Melichar, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeiti

INsTIlUT, supra note 4, at 448.

25 Id. 446-47.

0sterreich, in MAX-PLANCc-

582

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.120

The considerations that determine the choice of the organs of
review also affect methods of review (covered in chapter IV of the
book) and the effect of the decisions (covered in chapter V). Under
the American system, constitutional questions are determined as part
of the adversary process whenever relevant to the determination of a
concrete case. Under the Austrian system, by contrast, constitutional
issues are segregated from the rest of the case and submitted to the
Constitutional Court for separate determination. As provided by the
original Austrian Constitution, the initiative to bring a question before
the Constitutional Court lay only with certain political organs-for
example, the federal government with respect to legislation of the
"Ldinder." 2 As time went on, however, even the Austrians modified
their original position by a slight move toward decentralization. Under
a 1929 amendment to the Constitution, the ordinary courts of last
resort may initiate a review proceeding by the Constitutional Court
when the question is relevant to the determination of an actual controversy.2 7 Pending determination by the Constitutional Court, proceedings in the ordinary court may be stayed. Other countries, such as
Germany and Italy,
went one step further, vesting the initiating power
28
in lower courts.
Finally, with respect to the effect of the constitutional determination, the decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court simply invalidates the unconstitutional statute, binding everyone just as though it
had been repealed by the legislature.2 9 Under the American system,
in theory at least, the judgment of a court, even if it be the United
States Supreme Court, does no more than preclude application of the unconstitutional statute to the particular case pending before the court.
As a practical matter, however, under the doctrine of stare decisis, the
decision, when rendered by the Supreme Court, invalidates the statute
almost as effectively as a decision of a civilian constitutional court 3 0
In a thoughtful evaluation of risks inherent in the two systems,
Professor Cappelletti highlights two serious shortcomings of the centralized system." First, it has failed to produce a judiciary that possesses
"constitutional consciousness." Lack of constitutional responsibility
tends to produce a corresponding lack of sensitivity to constitutional
problems in the country. Secondly, the centralized system, with its
disjointed consideration of constitutional issues, tends to foster an
abstract, conceptualistic, and rigid approach to constitutional problems.
Turning to the American system, the author points to an array of devices by which the courts may evade or postpone the determination of
26 M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 2, at 72.
analogous to states or provinces.

27Id. 72-77.

281d. 75.
29

1d. 85.

301d. 86.

31MI. 79-83.

"Liinder" are political subdivisions
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constitutional issues in a particular case without striking down a statute that is in fact unconstitutional. The "political question," "case and
controversy," and "standing" doctrines are examples of such devices
of evasion. While the author expresses some concern about the desirability of avoiding or disguising the disposition of sensitive constitutional issues, he feels that on the whole the American system works
well and assures the continued effectiveness of judicial review without
excessive political disturbances.
I would stress another salient feature of the American system.
Perhaps its greatest virtue is its tendency to encourage constitutional
evaluations on a nationwide scale reaching to the judicial grass roots.
Constitutional doctrine is created in test tube fashion in literally thousands of courts all over the nation, day by day and case by case, by
giving each judge, high or low, the opportunity to speak at least the
first, if not the last, word on any constitutional issue. By contrast,
concentration of constitutional competence in a single unitary court not
only dulls "constitutional consciousness" in the performance of judges'
daily duties, but also stifles experimentation by lower level courts and
smothers the initiative of individual judges in dealing with crucial
societal issues. Defective in many ways as the American system may
be, hobbling along on decentralization, diffused consideration of constitutional issues, and the doctrine of stare decisis, it provides a generally effective structure within which the constitutional conscience of
the entire nation may evolve and find expression.
One last observation must not be omitted. While the author
underlines the different methods of constitutional control, he places
even greater emphasis on trends toward unity. Indeed, the search for
the "common core" of the various systems of review is a leading theme
that runs through the book. It is the author's thesis that, in response
to the experience of history and to the molding forces of practicality and
efficiency, the countries of the Western World are steadily moving
toward a harmonization of methods employed to protect the values
enshrined in modern constitutions. Thus, the author reminds us that
the very existence of constitutions and of courts with power to review
constitutionality, the dilution of the doctrine of separation of powers
in the civil law orbit, the accommodation by the United States Supreme
Court of cases outside traditional limits of the "case and controversy,"
"justiciability," and "standing" doctrines, and the gradual transformation of that court into "a special organ of constitutional review" 32
are symptoms of assimilation of the control mechanisms of the Western
World.
The book ends on a happy note of unity and ultimate victory of
constitutionalism: "The two worlds are becoming one, certainly in
terms of the questions that have been discussed .... ,,3
32 Kauper, The Supreme Court: Hybrid Organ of State, 21 Sw. L.J. 573, 577

(1967).
33

Mf.
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THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS. Volume I: Economic Principles; Volume II:
Institutional Issues. By ALFRED E. KAHN. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., Vol. I, 1970; Vol. II, 1971. Vol. I: Pp. xii,
212. $9.95. Vol. II: Pp. xiii, 352. $10.95.
Louis B. Schwartz t
The boundary between the realms of law and economics is, happily, not impenetrable. Venturesome chiefs among the tribes on each
side of the border cross it without passport or self-consciousness. One
thinks of Yale's archetypal interdisciplinarian, Walton Hamilton, and,
on the current scene, of such dashing cross-border raiders from the
law side as Baxter of Stanford, Turner of Harvard, Dam of Chicago,
Fulda of Texas. The economists have countered with, among others,
Adams of Michigan State, Phillips of Pennsylvania, Stigler of
Chicago, Caves and Kaysen of Harvard, Levin of Hofstra. In this
select group, Alfred E. Kahn's writings on antitrust policy have long
since established his place.' His latest work, here reviewed, carries
border-raiding to a new level of penetration, and raises the question
whether the border exists in reality or only in the habits of academic
curriculum planners. One is driven to reconsider the fundamental relation between the two social sciences.
It is the beginning of an answer to that problem to say that The
Economics of Regulation would be an entirely satisfactory text for use
in educating lawyers. It summarizes, accurately and brilliantly, what
courts, administrative agencies, and-most important-private managers are doing with regard to a wide spectrum of legal questions: utility
rates and services, discrimination, intermodal competition, national
planning, and integration, among others. It subjects this activity to a
critique that is the product not only of the special mathematical tools
of the economist (mercifully adapted to the fumbling hands of beginners), but also of a mature, confident and witty humanism. "Legal"
materials certainly could not provide a clearer path to comprehension
of this range of official and "private" behavior. Indeed, Kahn's treatise
is superior to the ordinary law school casebook precisely because it
superimposes on the conventional inquiries-about judicial review, legislative intent, precedent, primary jurisdiction-insistent queries about
allocation of resources, effectiveness of market competition to set
socially desirable prices, and demonstrable shortcomings of regulatory
t Benjamin Franklin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S. 1932,
LL.B. 1935, University of Pennsylvania.
1 See, e.g., M. DE CHAZEAU & A. KAHN, INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION IN THE
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1959); 3. DIRAm & A. KAHN, FAIR CoMPErrrIoN: THE LAW
AND EcoN omics OF ANTITRUST POLICY (1954).
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alternatives to market competition. This benefit derived from the use
of an economics treatise in educating lawyers is comparable to the gain
that economics students might realize if they studied the institutions of
economic regulation from a sophisticated legal casebook, where they
would be driven to take allocation of governmental power as seriously
as allocation of resources. Allocations of power-between judges and
commissioners, between the executive and the legislature, between
political powers and private oligarchs-sometimes seem to make economic analysis subordinate or peripheral to the decisionmaking process,
to the vast and uncomprehending irritation of inexperienced economists.
But Kahn's treatise hardly requires supplementation on the "legal"
side; its basic organization reflects his sensitivity to the institutional
setting in which economic "laws" must operate and be, only partially,
respected. The first volume is devoted to "principles," the second to
"institutional issues." As he passes from volume I's "rules for the
efficient pricing of public utility services" to volume II's "real world of
ignorance, error and corruption, where all institutions are in varying
degrees imperfect," the author offers a gentle admonition to those of
his fellow-professionals who might prefer to linger in their familiar
world of mathematical models:
[T]he economist, like anyone else, spends most of his time
doing the things that he is trained to do. In this, he is like
the man who, having dropped a coin on the sidewalk on a
dark night, looks for it under the street light, not necessarily
because he thinks that is where it probably has come to rest
but because that is the only place he has any hope of finding
it. The rules for efficient pricing flow out of the main stream
of microeconomics as it has developed during the last century
or two; that is our streetlight, and we make such use of it
as we can. . . . [But] the normative rules of economic behavior and performance . . .tell us absolutely nothing about

how to achieve these results. This is what we mean by the
institutionalproblems of regulation or of the ordering of the
economy generally: by what kinds of institutional arrangements can we obtain the maximum assurance (compatible
with such noneconomic values as security, freedom, due
process of law, and so on) that the goals will in fact be
achieved? 2
The style of The Economics of Regulation is as agreeable as the
intellectual merit is commanding. Humor, irony, modesty, and candor
leaven these pages. Kahn can illustrate the problem of allocating
common costs among different users of the same equipment by
2 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS

,d-xii (1971).
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reminding us that "the same mains carry gas to numerous customers
for heating, cooking, clothes-drying, and suicide." ' By way of demonstrating that non-economic considerations often prevail over marginalcost pricing, he contrasts the billions spent on space exploration with4
the meager appropriations for "the deplorably pacific War on Poverty."
And a playful passage on "externalities" includes the reflection that
"It is to my interest to have you use water freely-perhaps more freely
than you would if you had to pay the MC of supplying it to youespecially if I ride on the subway next to you." ' Kahn recurrently admits the limitations of economic expertise, as in the engaging footnote:
The reader will have to make his own allowances for the
possibility that most economists expressing such an opinionincluding this one--may not be unbiased. It is very difficult
for anyone but a pure theorist--'pure" in more than one
meaning of the word-to admit that he simply does not know
enough to be able to give useful advice, for which he is often
well paid.'
Everywhere the mood is questioning, exploratory, rather than dogmatic. The teacher has led his pupils through a forest of interesting
perplexities to a point where the woods may (or may not) be thinning
out to a clearing. The student senses that it is for him to go on
towards the light. There is no highway. He must make his own path.
I shall comment briefly on some of the main questions to which
Kahn addresses himself. These include: (1) where to draw the line
between free competition and government controls, a balancing of the
deficiencies of "the market" with the institutional shortcomings of regulation; (2) to what extent should regulated prices reflect investment,
i.e., some kind of "rate base"; (3) how should joint costs be allocated
among different classes of customers so as to avoid discrimination, and
in this connection, what limits should the government impose on competitive pricing by regulated firms.
Kahn, of course, is no blind believer in the absolute virtue of the
free market. If he finally opts for a presumption in favor of free enterprise as against government controls, and for according the narrowest
scope to the doctrine of "natural monopoly" on which so much of the
regulatory structure is sought to be justified, it is only after a revealing
account of market imperfections. Real markets rarely conform to
theoretical models. Capital and labor respond sluggishly to shifts in
costs and demands, often remaining frozen in sectors of overproduction
rather than moving into sectors where high profits signal a need for
expanded operations. Buyers and sellers frequently do not have the
3

1 A.

KAHN,

4 Id. 191.

5Id.194.
6Id. 196.

supra note 2, at 77.
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prompt and full information about product quality and prices that
perfect competition posits; and advertising assiduously circumscribes
rationality of choice. The optimum scale of operations may require
plants of such size that only a handful of firms can "compete"
oligopolistically.
To these fairly obvious imperfections in the market, well known
to many educated non-economists, must be added certain others perceived by modern economics as necessary qualifications to crude AdamSmithism, viz., "externalities," "neighborhood effects," and "secondbest" considerations. Kahn discusses these luminously. A free market
cannot allocate resources efficiently if producing firms do not bear the
social costs entailed in production. If a petroleum refinery pollutes the
air and water in its neighborhood, renders nearby homes uninhabitable,
or imposes exceptional maintenance costs on neighboring businesses,
exceptional public service costs on the municipality, and exceptional
medical costs on the nearby population, its costs, and consequently its
selling prices, will understate social costs. When important social costs
are thus "external" to the enterprise, more gas and oil will be sold, and
more resources will be allocated to their production, than proper social
accounting would sanction. Purchasing power and productive resources thus absorbed will be diverted from enterprises that do "pay
their own way" or from production of goods and services in the public
sector. Per contra, if a private business confers benefits on others, for
which the producing firm is not in a position to charge, the value of such
beneficial activities as set by the market will be lower than we would
prefer when the beneficent "neighborhood effects" of the activity are
taken into account. For example, the private operation of a fire-fighting
company for profit would confer benefits not only on its subscribers but
also on their neighbors for whom the risk of conflagration would be
reduced. The inability of the firm to secure compensation for these
benefits means that the firm's customers must pay somewhat higher
prices: fire-fighting will be less pervasive than collectively we desire.
Kahn has his own engaging and instructive variant on this theme, which
he calls "the tyranny of small decisions." He reflects amusingly on the
decline of railroad commuter service. He is himself an inveterate
motor commuter on publicly financed highways. But there come snowy
days in winter when he wants to go to town by train. The availability
of reliable back-up train service to meet such needs is of value to him
(and to millions of his fellow suburbanites). But the railroad has no
way of selling him this limited insurance policy; and if it had, he
probably wouldn't buy it anyway: the individual risk is too insignificant,
and each motorist would count on the daily riders to assure the availability of the back-up service. Result: a flow of revenue from the regular users that does not reflect the total benefits conferred; eventually,
restriction of service or, alternatively, a public subsidy that replaces the
impracticable "small decisions" with a large one.
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"Second-best" theory is one of the most intriguing insights that
economics has to offer on the question of when to require (or permit)
the market to govern. If two products are more or less substitutes for
each other, e.g., oil and natural gas, and the price of one is kept above
its marginal cost, whether by private monopoly or government regulation, society may be best advised to keep the price of the other above
its own marginal cost. It might be argued, for example, that the
price of natural gas should not be allowed to fall to its minimum
production cost as long as the price of oil is artificially inflated by
government import restrictions and restraints on domestic production.
Otherwise, the artificially high oil price would encourage a more rapid
utilization of gas than comparative social costs would justify. "Thou
shalt not optimize piecemeal," pronounces William Baumol in Welfare
Economics and the Theory of the State.' Kahn, as well, recognizes
that the usefulness of counter-inflating the gas price would have to be
appraised in the light of still other possible substitutions, e.g., coal and
nuclear energy in place of gas and oil. Thus, "second-best" considerations take one ever further afield from the immediate issue, giving rise
to McKie's skeptical observation that, "If we had to correct every misallocation in the economy before proceeding against any problem, we
could never have any policy for improvement at all.", 8
An inventory of defects in the functioning of markets in the real
world seems to demand that we turn to some more responsive system of
harnessing individual efforts and choices to the chariot of national wellbeing--or so it seems until Kahn brings the institutions of public
regulation under his microscope. Then the market begins to present
itself in the same light as democracy in Winston Churchill's famous
dictum: the worst of all governments until one looks at the alternatives.9
Kahn stresses the essentially negative role which administrative agencies
seem condemned to play. The important initiatives almost invariably
remain with private management, subject only to rare interventions by
the regulatory authorities. Funded at ridiculous levels,"0 overwhelmed
by astronomical numbers of transactions to be controlled, harried by
executive pressures, steering a tortuously political course under in7Id. 70, quoting W.

BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEoRY OF THE

30 (2d ed. 1965).
SProceedings of the American Economic Association, 1969, 60 Am. EcoN. REv.,
May 1970, at 108.
9 Cf. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 2, at 327-29.
10 See id. 326 n.3, relating to the Congressional hearings on Senator Metcalf's
proposed "Utility Consumers' Counsel Act of 1969." Itappeared, inter alia, that the
chief accountant of the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, responsible for
auditing the returns of 14 electric, 26 gas, 6 phone, and 63 water companies, 88 bus
and street car lines, 816 securities brokers, 2599 moving firms, and 15,055 truck
carriers, was paid $11,752 per year and had as his entire staff one other accountant
and a clerk. Cf. In re American Tel. & Tel. Co., 32 F.C.C.2d 691 (1971), in which
the Federal Communications Commission decided to defer indefinitely the major and
unique investigation of A.T.&T.'s investment and operating expenses which it had
previously ordered (27 F.C.C.2d 151 (1971)), on the ground of lack of sufficient
resources. The Commission soon reversed itself after public and congressional outcry.
See 40 U.S.L.W. 2504 (F.C.C. Jan. 28, 1972).
STATE
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tentionally ambiguous legislative guidelines, the agencies falter before
their staggering tasks. It is essential to cut back their responsibilities
to the limits of possible achievement, hence to leave to the free market
as large a territory as we can cordon off within the regulatory regime.
Skeptical as he is about regulation, Kahn nevertheless defends it against
extreme attacks from right and left. The Chicago School economists,
who argue that regulation is a useless and expensive exercise that
saves the consumer nothing in the long run, get a respectful hearing,
but eventually run into some devastating questions about cases where
regulatory agencies demonstrably cut hundreds of millions of dollars
from the bills that consumers had to pay." The Marxist thesis, that
regulation in a capitalist regime cannot be anything but a facade for
exploitation, and that nationalization is the only answer, meets a
sobering query about the dubious performance of the American Post
Office and other nationalized monopolies abroad." The complex truth
that evades all simplifications is that regulation, like antitrust, does
indeed sometimes function as a reassuring facade for the consolidation
of private economic power. But that is only to say that institutions can
be perverted, that power can be usurped, that impulses which lead to the
enactment of laws must be constantly reinvigorated. As I have elsewhere pointed out in criticizing Galbraith's airy dismissal of the antitrust laws,"3 these institutions, at the very least, assert the principle of
public accountability for monopolists' decisions. And the very existence
of forums in which those decisions may be challenged drastically
moderates the behavior of management.
At all events, the "natural monopoly" case, if no other, seems to
call for regulation, and Kahn turns his attention to the proper definition
of this category. Some productive processes can be carried on at progressively lower unit costs as the scale of operations increases. In such
cases it would appear desirable to concentrate production in the largest
single unit, i.e., to favor monopoly. But, as Kahn points out, this conclusion is based on a "static" analysis; it fails to take account of the
possibility-nay, the probability, that competition would set a faster
pace of technological innovation, as well as encourage cost cutting and
service improvement. The static gains derivable from concentration
may be more than offset by the dynamic gains which rivalry offers.
"May be"-hence the necessity for a common sense balancing of the
visible potentials, a common sense illuminated by the fullest knowledge
of technological trends, the best available data on cost curves, 14 a realization of the extent to which substitute products (themselves not
.112 A. KAHN, supra note 2, at 108-12.
12 Id. 328.
'3 Schwartz, Book Review, The New Industrial State, 81 HARv. L. REv. 915

(1968).
14 Cf. Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public,
22 STAN. L. RFv. 675, 697-703 (1970), in which the author demonstrates that cost
curves in the stock brokerage business do not, as commonly asserted, decline continuously with increases in the size of the firm.
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monopolized) provide the competitive goad that would otherwise be
lacking inside the natural monopoly, and a tough-minded appraisal of
the progressive or reactionary character of the management of particular
monopolies. It is typical of Kahn's even-handedness that he awards
A. T. & T. high scores for management and technological innovation
while excoriating the discriminatory and tying practices by which the
firm has artifically enlarged its "natural" monopoly. 5
Kahn's principle that the natural monopoly concept must be
jealously confined has several interesting corollaries. Pipelines, if in
themselves natural monopolies, should not be integrated with petroleum
production, an activity by no means subject to continuously declining
costs. Similarly, local gas distribution should not be combined with an
inherently competitive retail operation like the sale of household appliances, nor with housing construction designed to preempt markets
against alternative fuels and power sources. Giving full force to this
position we might say that if the economies of scale demand giant units
of production (hence few firms) in automobile assembly or in basic
steel and aluminum production, it becomes even more imperative that
these "naturally monopolistic" activities be divorced-in cases of metals,
from fabrication, and, in the case of auto manufacturing, from the
manufacture of automobile parts and the wholesaling or retailing of
automobiles. The same principle has, in fact, been accorded recognition
in American law for some time. Section 1(8) of the Interstate Commerce Act (the so-called "commodities clause"), restricting railroad
transportation of goods in which the carrier has a commercial interest,
is among the earliest examples. More recent legislation confines banks
and public utility companies to activities "incidental to" the core
enterprise. 6
The second of Kahn's themes concerns the role which investment
values should play in regulating prices. The author provides a lucid
review of conventional legal concepts and issues: fair return on a fairly
valued rate base, prudent investment, and reproduction cost, among
others. But there are surprises and illuminations in store for some of
his lawyer readers. Liberal lawyers have been brought up with a devout
respect for Justice Brandeis' campaign, eventually successfully, to
substitute prudent investment for reproduction cost as the base upon
which a fair return should be computed. Yet here is a liberal economist
to remind us that there is something to be said for using reproduction
cost, at least from the point of view of efficient allocation of resources.
Such a view derives from the principle that resources will be best allocated if each user must pay the additional cost which his particular use
15 2 A. KAHN, supra note 2, at 299-300; cf. id. 140-52.
16 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (Supp.
1972); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 79(k) (1970).
Cf. Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (banks in securities
business) Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970) (banks in data processing business).
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entails. That cost can hardly be determined by reference to capital
investments made long ago, i.e., to historic costs or prudent investment.
It must be determined rather by the discounted value of what it will
take to replace the productive capacity consumed by the user, whenever
in the future such replacement becomes necessary. It is only the
"crippling administrative infeasibility" of this "economic" standard
that renders it unacceptable.1 7 This observation by the author, however, makes mincemeat of his concomitant remark that there is, in this
regard, a "major discrepancy between the economist's prescription for
optimal pricing and the [legal] approach .

.

.

."

',

For the legal

approach, from Brandeis onward, has always rested heavily on "administrative infeasibility": the intolerable fluctuation of rates calculated
on shifting estimates of reproduction costs, the impossibility of reliably
forecasting the date of future capital retirements (or costs on that date),
and the virtual absence of a rational basis for selecting an interest rate
for discounting the investment required in the future so as to arrive at
a present cost attributable to the user. The economist referred to in
Kahn's statement about "discrepancy" is obviously not Kahn, whose
institutional views are evident on every page of his work.
But administrative feasibility is not, after all, the prime criterion
of utility regulation. Not even "fair return"-read "minimum return"
if you will-to investors is the goal or test of the system. The real
objective is low prices and improved service. This may well be attained
by regulation that allows a generous return to capital if, at the same
time, such regulation provides management with powerful incentives
to prune away useless expenses, to market aggressively so that the
declining-cost character of the business is fully exploited, and to explore
new technologies imaginatively and prudently. Incentive effects of
regulation are the central concern of Kahn's analysis. It is from this
point of view that he examines rate-base pricing, and, particularly, the
well-known "A-J-W effect." A-J-W postulates that a regulatory system which correlates return to investors with size of investment gives
management a strong incentive to inflate the investment base. The
inflation referred to need not be any crass misrepresentation or overvaluation; it is, rather, an excessive investment of real resources, even
a deliberate choice of a relatively inefficient capital-intensive method of
producing the service. One thinks, for example, of the temptation
facing the management of Megalopolis Electric Company when it can
meet an increasing demand either by building a high-cost plant in the
city (with all the externalized costs of air and water pollution) or by
buying power cheaply from a neighboring producer with low investment costs and excess capacity. Kahn discusses strikingly the A-J-W
impact on investment in the nuclear power and satellite communication
17 1 A. IAnN, supra note 2, at 89.
18

Id. 88-89.
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fields; 19 but, with characteristic even-handedness, points out that
assurance of a return on investment may encourage ventures in new
technology and serve to offset the natural tendency of a monopolist to
keep output below the socially desirable level.2"
The third of Kahn's major themes calling for discussion involves
the question of how joint or common costs should be allocated so as to
promote efficient use of resources. This problem, and its relation to
questions of "discrimination," can best be presented by illustration. A
power plant, a telephone system, or a gas pipeline must be built large
enough to handle the load at times of peak demand. Consequently,
during off-peak periods there will be idle capacity which might be sold
at "bargain" prices, yielding some return to the seller above out-ofpocket costs attributable to the particular transactions. Do such bargain prices "discriminate" in favor of off-peak customers, enabling
them to enjoy service without contributing their share to the capital
costs? Kahn believes that it is vain to seek a separate "cost" 21 for each
of jointly produced products. Only the aggregate cost of jointly produced units can be measured; and price policy must be directed at
aligning the joint price with that joint cost. What part of the joint
price is to be contributed by the users of product P and what part by
the users of product Q is determined not by their respective costs but
by the character of their respective demands. It may be that there are
substitutes for product P, so that P can be sold only at a competitive
price determined by those substitutes. P should then be sold at that
price, however small a contribution this makes to joint costs. Q, with
no substitutes and an inelastic demand, will be priced at what the traffic
will bear. The joint resources will be employed to their utmost, and
the additional capital that society would have to dedicate to the production of P-substitutes if P could not be sold at "nondiscriminatory"
prices is conserved. Q-users have no ground for complaint, for, however small the contribution of P-users to the joint costs, the cost burden
on Q-users is correspondingly diminished. The alternative is no contribution at all if P cannot be sold. For those who may be troubled by
the complete divorce between cost and pricing in the analysis, economists' magic has made it possible to translate the rationale from the
language of demand into the language of cost. The concept of "opportunity cost" 22 permits one to say that the cost of P, in the example
192 A. KAHN, supra note 2, at 52.

201d. 107.
21 Throughout this discussion I am speaking only of joint costs, not costs exclusively attributable to production of one of the joint products. Also, "cost" is here
used to refer to the kind of long-run marginal cost that economists would probably
accept as a criterion of regulated prices. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 2, at 83-86,

88-103.

"Opportunity Cost" is what the seller foregoes when he disposes of the last
Cf. 1 A. KAHN, supra
note 2, at 79-80, 93-94 n.11. This is equivalent to the price that the next potential
buyer would have been willing to pay. Thus, opportunity cost strikes an uninitiate
22

unit of product P to the customer "at the end of the queue".
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above, is whatever the seller can get for it, so that there is no economic
discrimination in the P-Q price differential, or-put another way-so
that any discrimination that is present is cost-justified.
Acceptance of this line of argument would have led to the opposite
result from that reached in the much publicized Ingot Molds Case,2 3
where the Supreme Court sustained the Interstate Commerce Commission in refusing to allow a railroad to lower a rate below fully distributed cost when the effect would be to take all the business away from
competing truck and barge lines. Kahn categorically condemns the
decision; 24 and in so doing he has, for once, slighted the "institutional"
considerations that actually determined the outcome. The Court was
confronted with a legislative mandate to protect the "inherent advantages" of competing modes of transportation. The phrase is undefined
in the statute, but it was clear from the legislative history that Congress
had rejected a formulation which would have awarded the palm of
inherent advantage to the carrier with the lowest incremental costs.
Since the ICC had generally employed fully distributed costs in determining which of two modes was inherently cheaper, and since Congress
(after a bitter controversy over the issue) had not reversed the Commission's historic policy, the Court was far from egregious error in
holding that Congress had intended the Commission to retain its discretion to define inherent advantage in terms of fully distributed cost.
From the institutional point of view, Ingot Molds is no more than a
decision as to which agency-Congress, the Commission, or the
Court-should make the economic choice. It certainly was not an
instance in which lawyers or judges overrode the judgment of economists; the Supreme Court explicitly disclaimed that, admitting that the
soundness of the economic views advanced was "not especially relevant
to the result we reach." 25 The decision is all the more understandable
in that the economic issue hardly lends itself to categorical disposition.
Kahn himself, notwithstanding the general principle favoring use of the
productive unit that incurs the lowest marginal cost, recognizes that
some circumstances require constraint on a utility's freedom to compete
on the basis of marginal cost:
There remains the possibility that although it may be more
efficient for society, in the static sense, to permit a public
as only an artificial way of speaking about the demand situation that the seller faces,

rather than his cost situation. The intellectual acrobatics required to assign classes
of customers to different queues, according to the different slope of their demand
curves, suggests some fragility in opportunity-cost theory. But it is undeniably
entertaining to speculate about whether, in any sense, it "costs" less to supply electric
power in the middle of the night or to put on a play for matinee audiences as
compared with evening performances.
23 American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 392 U.S.
571 (1968).
24 2 A. KAHx, supra note 2, at 162-66.
25 392 U.S. at 586 n.16.
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utility company to take the business away from its rivals by
reducing rates on competitive services to marginal costs, there
may be some dynamic loss if the result is the elimination of
those competitors. .
. [P] reserving the competitor and the
stimulus . . . of its continued presence might in the long run
contribute sufficiently to a greater and more varied innovation, to continual improvements in the industry's service and
efficiency to outweigh the static welfare loss involved in keeping it alive. This assessment could only be made in each par26
ticular instance ....
One has only to consider the discouraging effect, upon entry of new
competitors, or upon the inauguration of a price-cutting campaign by
existing competitors, of a rule of law that leaves open to a massive
utility the option to respond with selective incremental pricing.
It would be misleading to leave the impression that I favor the
protectionism involved in the "inherent advantage" formula. For me,
inherent advantage is best determined by free competition. But until
Congress manifests a genuine commitment to free competition whereever feasible, notably by removing all restraints upon entry and pricing
in motor vehicle transportation-a course that would really test the
viability of railroads and their crazy rate structures-Ingot Molds remains, for me, another minor skirmish between competing monopolists
for administrative favors.
One would wish for time and space to extend these reflections, to
point down one vista after another opened by these fascinating chapters:
the paradoxes of "peak responsibility pricing" (should commuters,
whose concentrated morning-and-evening train travel requires a capital
investment that lies idle most of the day, have to pay higher fares than
the mid-day rider?); the riddles of "cream skimming" (competitive
operation in profitable segments of a utility's operation without obliging the competitor to serve the unprofitable segments); national coordination of utility investment (e.g., by requiring neighboring power
producers to take turns in expanding plants, so that each builds to adequate scale in the light of regional rather than single firm demand forecasts). But it is time to return to a question posed at the beginning
of this review, the relationship between law and economics. No novel
or earth-shaking conclusions on so abstract (or pompous?) a topic can,
after all, arise from reading Kahn's urbane and pragmatic work.
The disciplines are obviously complementary. Economics-even
at its most speculative and abstract-is perpetually exposing old errors
and new considerations relevant to decisionmaking in government.
Law is perpetually reformulating the equations by which governmental
decisions are reached. Those equations contain many variables that
26

1 A.

KAHN,

supra note 2, at 176-77; cf. 2 A.

KAHN,

supra note 2, at 246-50.
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are non-economic: notions of fairness and national priority, administrative feasibility, political feasibility, the desirability of disposing of complex questions under rubrics simple enough to be appraised by legislature and public. If the equation occasionally seems to deprecate the
economic variable, that is more likely accounted for by the counterweight of other factors than by legal resistance to economic enlightenment. If the equation seems at times stubbornly resistant to change, it
is because stability is itself a value in the equation. Economists too
"temper principle with practicality" 27 by accepting, for the sake of
stability in utility rates, long range marginal costs rather than theoretically superior short range costs as the standard.
In relation to the legal order, other social sciences are in much the
same position as economics. The psychiatrist makes an essential contribution to criminal proceedings when he throws light on the emotional
organization of the accused, the extent of his power to choose between
desirable and undesirable courses of conduct. But the personality of the
accused is only one of many variables in the legal equation; and a psychiatrist who fails to perceive this is likely to feel acute frustration when
a man whom he regards as "ill" is nevertheless held "responsible."
He may even see such a judgment in terms of lawyers or jurors presuming to negate professional diagnosis. He will regard the statutory
formula separating the punishable from the exculpatingly ill, whether
McNaughten's Rules, Durham, or American Law Institute, contemptuously as a "legal" definition of a medical concept. Any such formulation is, on the contrary, only an administrable rule-of-thumb that takes
account-well or poorly-of such non-medical considerations as: the
pervasiveness and incalculable diversity of human "abnormality"; the
inherence of social and philosophic elements in the concept of mental
illness; the dearth of techniques and physical resources for the "cure"
of many forms of psychic deviation; and certainly the need (at the
guilt-determining stage of trial, although not perhaps at the sentencing
stage) to have rules disposing of categories of cases, so that the law
will at least appear to operate with a degree of consistency in similar
cases.
An historian too, applying the criteria of his speciality to the
criminal trial, would be likely to come away with scorn for this perverted way of "searching for the truth." Who ever heard of rejecting
a conclusion merely because it is not "established beyond a reasonable
doubt"? What even-handed searcher for truth would categorically
exclude from consideration hearsay, testimony of a spouse against his
mate, a confession obtained by pressure, incriminating evidence illegally
obtained by the police? What historian would withhold an adverse
judgment on a figure of the past until he could provide a lawyer for the
defense? Shall journalists and good citizens-amateur historians, all27 See

1 A. KAHN, supra note 2, at 83-86; cf. id. 182.
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really doubt the guilt of Oswald, "alleged" assassin of President
Kennedy, because the "presumption of innocence" has never been accorded to him in a legal proceeding? The answer to these rhetorical
questions lies, of course, in the fact that a criminal trial is not an
abstract search for historic verity. The trial lies primarily in the realm
of action, not cognition. A man's fate is to be disposed of, and in a
procedure that calls into question the tactics of government as much as
the behavior of the accused. We are committed to the proposition that
it is better for ten guilty to go free rather than one innocent be condemned. We know and intend that a verdict of "not guilty" means only
"not sufficiently proved" or even "proved but the law is silly." Painfully aware of the frailties of the trial process even at its best, and
perhaps in anxious dubiety about the utility of the entire system of
prosecution and punishment, we erect "arbitrary" barriers against conviction like the statute of limitations and the rule against double
jeopardy. In sum, the range of considerations is enormously broader
and different for lawyers than for historians.
The X-ray chooses not to see skin, fat, any tissue extraneous to
the target of its probe. Intellectual specialists must similarly blind
themselves to much that is ultimately relevant, in order to see more
deeply. The economist necessarily excludes from the range of his inquiry much that the lawyer cannot ignore. The mathematical economist
excludes much that the institutional economist regards as vital. Agricultural engineers, social psychologists, demographers, philosophers,
and public relations wizards, whose sciences feed into economics, presumably reproach economists for a certain imperviousness to their
respective illuminations.
For me, the moral of all this is the necessity for professional
modesty. The X-ray must not suffer the illusion that it sees all. The
general practitioner must not imagine that he has X-ray eyes, but must
be ever ready to examine those shadowy transparencies submitted to him
by the radiologist, and to listen comprehendingly to the specialist's
interpretation. The boundaries between the professions must remain
permeable, and we must honor the border-raiders.

